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In this study we have focused on North American companies from 1974 until 2015. Based 
on this sample, it was our objective, to better understand the three dimensions of capital 
structure variation: within-firm, within-industry and between industries. We concluded that 
most of the variation in financial structures arises from within-industries rather than between 
industries. Additionally, in the period considered, within-industry variation was interpreted as 
the one that showcased the greatest increase, (43%) Taking into consideration these intriguing 
results, we decided to regress leverage ratios on industry leverage medians, which confirmed 
the little importance of industry in explaining firm financial structure. In order to better 
understand how leverage is organized within the different industries, we developed the 
concept of “level” and “consistency”, reaching a new stylized fact in this area of research, by 
concluding that industries which portray the highest or the lowest capital structures’ 
dispersion tend to remain this way for long periods of time. Finally, we proved that capital 
structure variation is associated to firms in industries with shorter longevities, higher 
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Este estudo foca-se em empresas norte americanas para o período entre 1974 e 2015. Com 
base nesta amostra, pretendemos perceber melhor como é que a variação na estrutura de 
capital está dividida pelas suas três componentes: dentro da empresa, dentro da indústria e 
entre indústrias. Concluímos que grande parte da variação nas estruturas de financiamento 
tem origem dentro das indústrias em vez de entre as indústrias. Ainda em relação ao período 
da nossa amostra, constatamos que a variação dentro da indústria foi a que teve um maior 
aumento, de cerca de 43%. Ao obter estes resultados intrigantes, decidimos estimar uma 
regressão entre os rácios de financiamento e os valores medianos por indústria, acabando este 
passo por confirmar a pouca importância que a indústria tem em explicar as estruturas de 
capital. Com o objetivo de perceber melhor como é que a estrutura de capital está organizada 
dentro das várias indústrias, criámos os conceitos de “level” e “consistency”. Concluímos que 
as indústrias com maior e menor dispersão do endividamento, tendem a manter-se dessa 
forma por longos períodos de tempo. Para terminar, mostramos que as indústrias com grande 
dispersão de financiamento estão associadas a indústrias cujas empresas demonstram : menos 
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This dissertation aims at improving the discussion on how firms choose their capital 
structures and to better understand which factors induce firms to opt for different types of 
financial instruments. More specifically this study is going to focus on the importance of the 
industry characteristics in the determination of the firms’ leverage ratios. 
It could be expected that the factors influencing the firm’s optimal capital structure would 
exhibit important industry commonalities, leading to similar leverage ratios across firms 
within the same industry. However, as soon as we turn to existing literature on this topic, we 
understand that there is a wide disparity in the leverage ratios of firms within the same 
industry, leading us to question, which factors indeed influence the choice of a firm’s leverage 
ratio. After noticing this empirical result, we adress this problem in a different way, by 
analyzing which industries have the highest capital structure dispersion, and what are the 
characteristics do these industries portray in order to motivate firms to finance in different 
ways. 
These were the questions that motivated all the research and analysis presented in the 
following sections of this study. We first started by focusing on how disperse the leverage 
within each industry may be. The answer to this question is provided in section 4.1 as we 
computed the percentage of the overall variation that can be attributed to the three variation 
categories, these being within-firm, within-industry and between industries variation. After 
understanding the dimension of the within industry variation, it was our objective in section 
4.2, to understand how it has been evolving through time, plus trying to realize the impact of 
the 2008 financial crisis in the different types of leverage variation. 
The next step in our investigation was then to figure out what was the relevance of the 
industry environment on the definition of the different firms’ leverage ratios. From this 
analysis, we should be able to understand whether it makes sense to have similar leverage 
ratios within the same industry or not. 
Finally, under sections 4.4 and 4.5, we elaborated on the created concepts of “level” and 
“consistency”, to provide a deeper analysis on the characteristics of the within-industry 
variation. It was our objective to understand which industries have the highest capital 
structure dispersion and how consistent was this variation across time. More specifically, in 
section 4.5, we tried to answer to our main research problem, by identifying which industry 
characteristics could lead firms to take on different financing decisions, from the ones taken 




Overall, our paper provides a further understanding on how leverage varies and why this 
variation is so high across firms within the same industry. The remainder of the paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to review the different, and at times 
contradictory, results in the literature. Section 3 provides all the details regarding the 
variables’ construction, the sources of our data, and the sample selection process. Section 4 
discusses our empirical analysis. Section 5 sums up all the results provided. Finally Section 6, 
explores all the limitations and recommendations for future research. 
2. Literature review 
The way that firms choose their capital structures is an open question and an important 
area of research in corporate finance. According to Myers (1984) the research in this field 
was, in his time, not able to explain why firms opt for the debt, equity and other securities that 
they issue. Myers (1984) named it as “the capital structure puzzle”. Also in his paper, he 
introduced a new research direction. Instead of trying to understand what the optimal capital 
structure was, the author tried to explain the actual financing decisions. 
 
Empirical work tries to come up with explanations on how firm characteristics influence 
the way that those firms take their financing decisions. 
One of capital structure research main goals is to explain heterogeneity in observed capital 
structures, as a way of solving part of this intricate puzzle. It could be expected that firm-
specific factors would exhibit important industry commonalities, given that firms in the same 
industry are affected by the same business cycles and share the same asset risks, covenants 
and limitations. As a consequence, empirical evidence should present related firm leverage 
ratios within the same industry. There are, however, studies which contradict this result. On 
one hand, Schwartz and Aronson (1967) and Scott (1972) verify, through their research, the 
existence of persistent differences across industries and strong intra-industry similarities in 
firm leverage ratios. On the other hand, Remmers et al. (1974), Ferri and Jones (1979) present 
contradictory results. 
 
Later on, Graham and Leary (2011) observe that the use of leverage is very different from 
firm to firm. In the lowest book debt to assets ratio quintile, the average leverage is 1% while 
in the highest quintile the average is about 63%. Through their research, these authors were 
able to identify the main differences between high and low leveraged companies. High 
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leverage companies are significantly larger and older. Further, they have more tangible assets, 
lower market-to-book ratios, less volatile earnings, and are less R&D-intensive. However, it is 
relevant to take into consideration the non-linear relation those characteristics have with the 
level of leverage. This non linearity is observable when we look at the highest leverage 
quintile, which is mainly characterized by smaller and younger firms, with higher market-to-
book ratios than firms with moderately high leverage.  
 
Graham and Leary (2011) split the total leverage variation in three parts: Within-Firm 
(leverage variance of each firm across time), Within-Industries (variance of each firm 
leverage mean per industry) and Between-industry (variance of the several industry leverage 
mean). Approximately 60% of the total capital structure variation arises cross-sectionally 
(Within-industry and Between-industry) rather than within-firm, thus proving consistent to 
Lemmon et al. (2008) results,  which suggests that corporate capital structures are stable over 
long periods of time. From that cross-sectional variation, however, the majority is verified 
across firms within a given industry (44%) rather than between industries (14%) (consistent 
with MacKay and Phillips (2005)). Lemmon et al. (2008) also computed the within- and 
between-firm variation of leverage. For book leverage, these estimates are 12.9% (15.5% 
market leverage) and 19.9% (22.9% market leverage), respectively. As it can be noticed, 
between-firm variation is approximately 50% larger than the within-firm variation, which 
confirms the previous results. Another interesting result presented by Graham and Leary 
(2011) is the fact that the overall cross-sectional standard deviation has increased by 
approximately 1/3 from 1974 to 2009. Most of this increase has occurred within-industries, 
while the between-industry standard deviation has remained almost constant.  
According to Almazan and Molina (2002) firms in some industries have very similar 
capital structures (e.g., computer software, food processing, and drug production), while in 
other industries, firms are financed very differently (e.g., trucking transportation, food 
wholesale, and drugstores). Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) argue that firms’ capital 
structure is determined by the firm’s choice of technology, implying that industries with 
multiple technologies will feature greater dispersion in their capital structures. Almazan and 
Molina (2002) also concluded that greater capital structure variation occurs in industries: that 
are more concentrated, with looser governance practices, in which leasing is an important 




Bearing in mind the non-linearity between firm characteristics and leverage variation, 
Graham and Leary (2011) try to explain the latter by using a linear function, a contradiction 
that the authors are ware of. In order to explain within-firm leverage variation, the dependent 
variable is the leverage for each firm 𝑖 for each period 𝑡 and the independent variables are 
proxies for leverage determinants plus firm fixed effects (𝜌𝑖).  
𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡      (1) 
 
To explain between-industry variation, the independent variable is considered as being  
the mean leverage for each industry 𝑗 for each period 𝑡 and the independent variables are the 
same proxies plus year fixed effects (𝛾𝑡). 
?̅?.𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽?̅?.𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡      (2) 
 
Finally, to explain within-industry variation, the dependent variable is leverage for each 
firm 𝑖 in each industry 𝑗, while the independent variable is, once more, the proxies plus 
industry fixed effects (𝜂𝑗).  
𝐿𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜂𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗      (3) 
 
Leverage determinant proxies are more successful in explaining cross-sectional leverage 
variation than within firm variation. Regarding the cross-sectional variation, the between-
industry variation is better explained (20% and 29% for book and market leverage, 
respectively) than within-industry variation (15% and 20%). Further, the weak explanatory 
power of those proxies has declined over time, mainly for within-industry variation, in which 
the 𝑅2 of the previously explained regression, for book leverage has fallen from almost 30%, 
in 1974, to less than 10% in 2008. 
 
According to Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim, (1984) there are strong industry influences across 
firms’ leverage ratios. By performing the standard analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the 
cross-sectional regressions on industry dummy variables, 54% of variation in firm leverage 
ratios is explained. Even when excluded from the regression all regulated firms during the 
sample period, a 𝑅2 of 25% is still achieved. By eliminating the regulated industries, a 
decrease on the explanatory power of the industry dummies is to be expected, given that in 
the regulated industries the leverage ratios should be very homogeneous, leading to a higher 
explanatory power of the industry dummy. The volatility of firm earnings is an important, 
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inverse determinant of firm’s leverage. It helps explain both inter- and intra-industry 
variations in firm leverage ratios. Approximately 34% of the cross-sectional variation in firm 
earnings can be explained by industry variable. 
 
Mackay and Phillips (2005) decided to regress firm-level financial leverage on industry-
level medians, in order to capture the importance of industry and firm effects. They concluded 
that industry fixed effects account for only 13% of the variation on financial structure, a result 
close to the 14% obtained by Graham and Leary (2011). In contrast, firm fixed effects are 
shown to explain 54% (44% in Graham and Leary (2011)) of the variation on financial 
structure, which attests that most of the variation in financial leverage arises within industries 
rather than between industries, as only the remaining 33% (42% in Graham and Leary (2011)) 
accounts for within-firm variation. Despite adopting a very different methodology, Graham 
and Leary (2011) reached very similar results.  
Lemmon et al. (2008) took an alternative approach to understand the variance 
decomposition of leverage. The authors did an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) which 
splits the variation in leverage into different factors. Again, firm fixed effects alone capture 
most of the leverage variation, yielding an adjusted 𝑅2 of 60% in book leverage. Once other 
variables are added to the model specification, there is only an increase in the adjusted 𝑅2of 3 
percentage points. 
By observing all the leverage regressions on firm/industry variables, we can conclude that 
the adjusted R-squares range between 13% and 29% (13% in Mackay and Phillips (2005), 
18% Lemmon et al. (2008)). In contrast, the adjusted R-square from a regression of leverage 
on firm fixed effects is close to 60% (67% in Mackay and Phillips (2005), 63% Lemmon et al. 
(2008)). The time effects capture 1% of the variation, implying that the majority of variation 
in leverage in a panel of firms is time invariant and is largely unexplained by previously 
identified determinants. This outcome is very important because capital structure theories 
based on variables that widely change over time are proven implausible explanations for 
capital structure heterogeneity. 
In Graham and Leary (2011), the authors acknowledge that firm fixed effects capture a 
large part of the unexplained capital structure and that there was a need to identify which 
firm-specific, and largely time-invariant, characteristics were missing from their models. 
Given the relative unimportance of industry fixed effects in explaining financial structure, 
Mackay and Phillips (2005) came up with other industry-related factors that could account for 
some of the wide variation observed within industries. Those measures were inspired on 
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industry equilibrium models, and included the similarity of a firm’s capital–labor ratio to the 
industry median (Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) Natural Hedge idea), the actions of its 
industry peers (later on further studied by Leary and Roberts (2014)) and the firm’s status as 
an entrant, incumbent, or exiting firm. 
 
In their study, Mackay and Phillips (2005) distinguish between competitive and 
concentrated industries, considering that competitive industry models perform poorly in 
concentrated industries. Therefore, they obtain different results in the two types of industries. 
Results from this paper showcases that firms in concentrated industries cluster around higher 
leverage levels, while profitability and asset size are both substantially higher. In turn, for 
firms in competitive industries the leverage is reduced and more dispersed, revealing higher 
and more dispersed risk levels. This finding is in accordance to the study developed by Long 
and Malitz (1983) and Williamson (1981) that evidenced significant negative relationships 
between unlevered betas (risk level) and the level of borrowing. These results are contrary the 
one’s presented by Almazan and Melina (2002), who find greater dispersion in more 
concentrated industries and contradict the belief that competition in competitive industries 
leads firms to adopt similar financial structure and cost structures. These base results confirm 
that understanding the effect of industry on firm decisions requires a richer treatment than 
simply to account for industry fixed effects. 
According to competitive-industry equilibrium models, firms choose simultaneously their 
financial structure, technology (capital and labour) and risk. The firm’s position within its 
industry matters for these choices. Companies near the industry median capital–labor ratio use 
less financial leverage than those that deviate from the same indicator. According to the 
results of the regression performed by Mackay and Phillips (2005), in which the authors 
regress the level of leverage to some entry/exit dummies and industry variables, we can 
observe that there is a significant inverse relation between financial leverage and the variable 
that represents how close a firm is from the industry median technology. It is important to 
mention that these results are not statistically nor economically significant in concentrated 
industries, confirming what has previously been said regarding the use of competitive-
industry models in concentrated industries. In Maksimovic and Zechner (1991), the authors 
developed the concept of natural hedge, which is able to quantify the position that each firm 
occupies within its industry. NH (natural edge) is computed as 1 minus the ratio between the 
deviation from the median capital-labor ratio and the range of all deviations. A NH varies 
between 0 and 1, where one indicates that the firm’s capital–labor ratio is identical to the 
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industry-year median capital–labor ratio and zero indicates the opposite. It is observed that 
firms near the median industry technology benefit from a risk reducing ‘‘natural hedge’’. This 
result is consistent with Maksimovic and Zechner’s (1991) prediction, as companies at the 
technological core of an industry experience lower cash-flow risk and use less debt than firms 
at the technological fringe. The relation between cash-flow risk and leverage is not 
consensual. According to Kim and Sorensen (1986) this relation should be positive. 
Contrastingly, Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) consider it to be negative, while Titman and 
Wessels (1988) believe it to be indifferent. According to the regression estimated by Mackay 
and Phillips (2005), the results show that firms with riskier cash flows tend to use more 
financial leverage. The authors present a possible reason for the existence of mixed results in 
the literature. In their line of reasoning, such explanation relies on the different econometric 
treatment of both simultaneous decision variables and endogenous explanatory variables, in 
the different studies.  
 
In Williams (1995) and Fries, Miller, and Perraudin (1997), the industry position refers to 
whether a firm belongs to the core or the fringe of its industry or on its status as entrant, 
incumbent, or exiting firm. We can easily understand that the capital structure of an entrant 
company should be different from one of an incumbent. According to Mackay and Phillips 
(2005) entrants have higher financial leverage ratios than incumbents, revealing a reliance on 
debt at the beginning. Entrants begin less capital-intensive and less profitable than 
incumbents, but tend to converge towards incumbent levels. These findings suggest that, due 
to the limited access to capital markets, entrant firms must first rely on less efficient, labor-
intensive technologies, as predicted by Williams (1995). Also, exiters leave their industries 
much more leveraged, risky, and unprofitable than incumbents (financial and economic 
distress). 
 
Firms’ real and financial characteristics are inversely related to changes in the same 
variables made by other firms in its industry. In the case of concentrated industries there is a 
greater reaction to peers’ choices, given the higher importance of strategic interaction. This 
peer effect is consistent with Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) findings, as the equilibrium 
process is considered to drive firms to react differently to common industry shocks. Related 
with this fact, Mackay and Phillips (2005) find that firms only slightly adjust their financial 
structures as a response to overall industry trends. This finding is consistent with Roberts 
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(2002) study, who, through his findings, reports that firms do not adjust their financial 
structure to industry targets, but rather to a firm-specific financial structure target. 
 
All these models show that industry equilibrium forces act to sustain intra-industry 
diversity rather than smoothing it away, thus causing firm heterogeneity to arise as an 
equilibrium outcome. 
 
In terms of data, all papers use data from North American markets. Most data was taken 
from COMPUSTAT and CRSP. The period that the different studies cover depends from 
paper to paper. In the case of Almazan and Molina (2002) the sample ranges from 1992 to 
1997, in Mackay and Phillips (2005) the data ranges from 1981 to 2000, in Lemmon et al. 
(2008) the paper covers the period between 1965 and 2003 and finally the paper Graham and 
Leary (2011) is focused over the period between 1974 and 2009. To what concerns industry 
classification, Mackay and Phillips (2005) and Graham and Leary (2011) used the 4 digit SIC 
code. However, Almazan and Molina (2002) opted for two distinct approaches in order to 
better capture competitive links among firm (Value Line Investment Survey1 and OG2). 
Mackay and Phillips (2005) limited the sample to firms operating in manufacturing industries 
and excluded firms in industries classified as miscellaneous. Alternatively, Graham and Leary 
(2011) only excluded utility and financial firms, government entities and firms with book 
assets less than $10 million. To measure industries’ concentration, Mackay and Phillips 
(2005) used the Herfindahl– Hirschman Index, HHI, from the Census of Manufacturers. 
Industries below a HHI of 1000 were considered as being competitive industries, while 
industries with a HHI higher than 1800 were considered as being concentrated industries. 
Conclusively, Mackay and Philips (2005) ended up with 3074 firms (17,140 firm-years) 
operating in 315 competitive industries and 309 firms (1,630 firm-years) operating in 46 
concentrated industries. 
                                                 
1 Value Line analysts evaluate each industry and publish a comprehensive industry grouping along with their 
analysis and data for the firms considered in each industry. 
2 Own industry classification is based on the VL classification and modify it using several sources of public 
information about the firms that include industry trade publications and SEC filings. 
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3. Data and sample selection 
The sample consists of active and inactive firms in the annual Compustat file over the 
period 1974-2015, excluding firms from the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate sector (SIC 
6000-6999) from Utilities (SIC 4910-4942) and from Public Administration (SIC 9111-9999). 
We further exclude firms with total book assets less than $10 million, firms with only one 
firm-year observation and industries composed of only one company. We also remove from 
our sample observations that the numeric value was a missing value code, as the ones 
presented in Appendix 1. This data selection methodology was inspired in Graham and Leary 
(2011) and it is consistent with the remaining literature. 
An essential part of this study is related to the way that we construct our variables. Taking 
into consideration the research made on this field, we noticed that the literature is very 
consistent regarding the definition of both market and book leverage ratios. Market leverage 
is equal to book value of short- and long-term debt divided by the sum of the book value of 
debt and the market value of equity. Book leverage is defined as book value of debt divided 
by book assets. These variables definitions are consistent with our objective of better 
understanding how firms take their financial debt decisions. Just like Lemmon et al. (2008) 
and Mackay and Phillips (2005) we require both leverage ratios to lie in the closed unit 
interval. 
In order to categorize firms into industries we used 4 digit SIC (Standard Industrial 
Classification) codes. The way that we cluster firms into industries is essential for the validity 
of our results. It was our objective to use the deepest level of classification to ensure the right 
competitive links between firms in each group. The reason why we opted for SIC code 
classification system, was the possibility that it gave us to compare our results to the 
remaining literature. In section 6, we discuss the limitations of this system and provide 
alternatives for future research. 
We end up with two data samples, one to compute book leverage ratios and another one 
for the market leverage ratios. The last data sample just holds firm-year observations with a 
market equity value. The book leverage sample forms an unbalanced panel of 13,604 firms 
(161,111 firm-years) operating in 389 industries. The market leverage sample forms an 
unbalanced panel of 11,629 firms (137,548 firm-years) operating in 385 industries. For the 
sake of better understanding the composition of our sample we provide in the Appendix 3, a 




Table 1: Summary Statistics 
The sample consists of active and inactive firms in the annual Compustat file over the period 1974-
2015, excluding firms form the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate sectors, from Utilities and from 
Public Administration. We further exclude firms with total book assets less than $10 million, firms 
with only one firm-year observation and industries composed of only one company. The table presents 
variable averages, medians, and standard deviations (SD) for both Book and Market Sample. Variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix 2. 
 
 
From table 1 we are able to understand that on average market leverage is higher than 
book leverage and a little more dispersed. If we compare these summary statistics to the ones 
provided by Lemmon et al. (2008), we notice that even though our samples have a 10 year 
lag, the results are very similar. 
 
4. Empirical analysis and results 
We have decided to split our analysis in 5 sub-sections. First, we want to understand how 
leverage ratios vary in our sample (section 4.1) and how this variation has been evolving 
through time (section 4.2). Then in section 4.3 we estimate the importance of industry on the 
firm leverage ratios. Finally in the last two sections, we identify which industries vary the 
most and the least, so that we could trace a profile of which industry characteristics have a 
stronger relation to the capital structure variation. The results presented for book ratios are 
always computed based on the book sample, unless otherwise stated. 
 
4.1. Analysis of leverage variation  
Our main purpose in this section is to better understand how leverage ratios vary. We are 




Within-firm variation is the time series leverage variation for each individual firm. In 
other words, a high within-firm variation means that from year to year a company changes a 
lot its capital structure. 
Within-industry variation is how much diffuse are firm’s leverage ratios inside each 
industry. For instance, a high within-industry variation suggests that firms inside a certain 
industry have very dispersed capital structures. 
Finally, between industries variation translates how different are the capital structures 
across different industries. For example, a high between industry variation means that the 
capital structures for each industry are very different from industry to industry, thus industry 
characteristics influence the way that firms finance its activities. 
 
In this respect, we have applied the following formula to compute the different types of 
leverage variation. In the equation, 𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the leverage ratio for firm 𝑖 at period 𝑡, ?̅?𝑖𝑗. is the 
within-firm mean for firm 𝑖, ?̿?.𝑗. is the industry mean for industry 𝑗, and ?̿̅? the grand mean. 
 
∑ ∑ ∑ (𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 − ?̿̅?)
2
𝑡𝑗𝑖 = ∑ ∑ ∑ [(𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖𝑗.) + (?̅?𝑖𝑗. − ?̿?.𝑗.) + (?̿?.𝑗. − ?̿̅?)]
2
𝑡𝑗𝑖     (4) 
= ∑ ∑ ∑ (𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖𝑗.)
2
𝑡𝑗𝑖  Within-firm 
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ (?̅?𝑖𝑗. − ?̿?.𝑗.)
2
𝑡𝑗𝑖  Within-industry 
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ (?̿?.𝑗. − ?̿̅?)
2
𝑡𝑗𝑖  Between industries 
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ 2𝑡𝑗𝑖 (𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖𝑗.)(?̅?𝑖𝑗. − ?̿?.𝑗.) Cross products 
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ 2𝑡𝑗𝑖 (?̅?𝑖𝑗. − ?̿?.𝑗.) (?̿?.𝑗. − ?̿̅?) Cross products 
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ 2𝑡𝑗𝑖 (𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖𝑗.) (?̿?.𝑗. − ?̿̅?) Cross products 
 
This methodology was inspired in Graham and Leary (2011). However, in their work, 
they did not include the cross products, something that we have decided to include, for 
completeness. The same formula was applied to both book and market leverage samples. 
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Table 2: Analysis of Leverage Variation 
This table presents the results obtained with equation (4). The first two columns report the variation in 
book leverage (column 1) and market leverage (column 2), divided into four categories (within-firm, 
within-industry, between industries and cross products). The last two columns report the proportion of 
total variation excluding the cross-products, so that it could sum 100%. 
 
 
First, we observe that most of the variation in financial structure arises within-industries 
(47% for book leverage and 43% for market leverage) rather than between industries (20% for 
book leverage and 22% market leverage), consistent with the findings of Mackay and Phillips 
(2005). Table 2 also shows that leverage varies more cross-sectionally (67% book leverage 
and 65% market leverage) than within firms (33% book leverage and 35% market leverage), 
consistent with the findings of Lemmon et al. (2008).  
Comparing both studies, it is evident the decrease in the within-firm variation from 42% 
(38%) to 33% (35%) in book (market) leverage and the increase in the within- industry 
variation from 44% (42%) to 47% (43%) in book (market) leverage. Between industries 
variation also increased from 14% (20%) to 20% (22%) in book (market) leverage. One of the 
differences between our sample and the one used by Graham and Leary (2011) is the 
inclusion of the time period between 2009 and 2015. This period includes most of the effects 
of the 2008 financial crisis, which can justify the different results. 
What does it mean the within-industry variation to be larger than the between industry 
variation? According to our results within-industry variation is about two times larger than 
between industry variation. It seems that we can conclude, from these results, that the 
leverage inside industries is more disperse than the leverage between different industries, in 
other words, that the leverage in different industries is more similar than the leverage inside a 
certain industry. In our opinion this conclusion is wrong. We need to take into consideration 
how the formula is built. When computing the between industry variation we are just 
computing the variation of the industry means. As a consequence, this variable is the result of 
several averages in a sample that just varies between 0 and 1, leading to similar industry 
means. Inevitably the within-industry variation is higher than the between industry variation. 
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Another way to present the variation in financial structure is through a graphical 
representation. Figure 1 illustrates how financial structure varies between and within 
industries. These figures were built according to the methodology followed by Mackay and 
Phillips (2005). In their analysis, they compared leverage variation between competitive and 
concentrated industries. The objective of the following analysis is different. Instead, we 
decided to represent graphically the leverage variation for the entire population of firms and 
industries, comparing the variation between book and market ratios. 
First, to better understand the meaning of the graphs presented in figure 1, we are going to 
explain how to construct them. We begin by computing the time-series leverage average for 
each firm. Then, we calculate the standard deviation of these firm averages across firms 
within each industry. At this point we are able to compare the level of variation between the 
different industries, by grouping industries into industry-dispersion quintiles. These quintiles 
are described in the graphs as being the intra-industry debt/asset dispersion. With respect to 
the within-industry variation analysis, we form financial leverage quintiles within each of 
these industry-dispersion quintiles. Those financial leverage quintiles are presented in the 
graph as debt/asset percentiles. Finally, to build the vertical axis named as debt/asset ratio, we 
compute the financial leverage medians for the 25 clusters created. 
Similarly to the results obtained by Mackay and Phillips (2005), we notice from both 
figures that even within the least dispersed industries, the financial leverage dispersion is very 
high. In accordance to the summary statistics presented previously (table 1), we cannot find 
significant differences between book and market leverage ratios. 
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Figure 1: Dispersion in financial leverage  
Two bar charts are presented one related to the dispersion in book financial leverage (a) and another 
one, related to the dispersion in market financial leverage. Both figures show how financial structure 
varies between and within industries. 
a) Dispersion in book financial leverage 
 
b) Dispersion in market financial leverage 
 
 
4.2. Leverage variation through time 
This section is dedicated to comprehend how leverage variation is evolving through time 
and the impact that the 2008 financial crisis had on these variables. The methodology is the 
same as the one used in Graham and Leary (2011), applied to our book leverage sample. 
One evident conclusion that can be taken from the analysis of figure 2, is the fact that 
within-industry variation has been regularly higher than between industry variation. This 
finding is consistent with the results obtained in table 2 of the previous section. Another 
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interesting conclusion, is the fact that from 1974 until 2015, within-industry variation was the 
one that has increased the most, with an increase of 43%. Both total variation and between-
industry variation also increased respectively by, 39% and 34%.  
 
Figure 2: Time-series evolution of leverage variation 
The three types of leverage variation were calculated for every year, from 1974 until 2015, based only 
on the book sample. The solid line displays the total variation, which is obtained by doing the standard 
deviation of all firms’ book leverage ratios for each year. The long-dash line displays within-industry 





. The dotted line represents the between industry variation, 
which is obtained by doing the standard deviation of the industry average leverage ratios. 
 
 
Figure 3: Percentage changes in leverage variation 
This figure provides further detail, regarding the percentage changes in the different types of leverage 





From the analysis of figure 2, it is possible to conclude that leverage variation increased in 
the period after the crisis. Nevertheless, figure 3 provides a further understanding regarding 
the impact of the financial crisis in leverage variation. In 2010 all types of leverage variation 
decreased, being evident the big drop in the between industry variation that is compensated by 
a significant increase in the following year. As a note to this analysis, in appendix 5, we are 
able to observe the evolution of the average book leverage ratios, in the period after the crisis. 
It is clear that, there was a drop in the firm’s leverage between 2008 and 2010. From 2010 
until today, the increase has been steady and persistent, having already surpassed the debt-to-
assets ratios before crisis. In general, we are not able to identify a relevant impact of the 2008 
financial crisis in the leverage variation variables. 
 
4.3. Importance of industry to firm financial leverage 
The main objective of this section is to better understand the importance of industry on 
firms’ leverage ratios. We are able to answer this question by regressing firm-level book 
leverage ratios on industry year median levels. In our analysis, the industry fixed effects are 
nested, given that when we are computing the industry median leverage, we exclude the firm 
from the calculation of the median. For instance, when computing the median for a given firm 
in a certain four-digit SIC code, we exclude this firm from the calculation of the median. This 
analysis turns out to be an analysis of variance where the adjusted R-square indicates the 
importance of industry in explaining the firms’ leverage ratios. The results presented in table 
3, demonstrate what Mackay and Philips (2005) and Lemmon et al. (2008) had already 
concluded: industry explains a small part of the leverage variation. From our regression, we 
obtain an adjusted R-square of 12.77%, a very similar result to the 13% obtained by Mackay 
and Philips (2005). It is important to highlight that in our sample we consider all industries, 
excluding firms form the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate sector from Utilities and from 
Public Administration, and in Mackay and Philips (2005) they just consider competitive 
industries (industries with a Herfindahl– Hirschman Index under 1000). It is interesting to 




Table 3: Importance of industry medians to firm’s leverage ratios 
Ordinary least squares regressions of firm’s leverage ratios on industry-year medians for the entire 
book sample between 1974 and 2015. We estimate the following equation: 
𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡. When calculating the industry medians the firm into 
consideration is excluded. 
 
 
4.4. Level and consistency in within industry variation 
All previous sections try to explain how leverage varies and the importance that industries 
have on the definition of firms’ leverage ratios. At this point, it is evident that most of the 
leverage variation occurs in firms of the same industry and that industry fixed effects have 
little explanatory power. As a consequence of these results, our objective for this section is to 
better understand the within-industry variation. In this respect, we are going to further explore 
which industries have the highest leverage dispersion and how consistent is this variation 
across time. 
 
In this section we are going to use our book sample, given that it provides a wider range of 
data and does not limit our sample to only quoted firms, which could bias our results. To 
begin our within-industry analysis, we have created a histogram, figure 4, which splits all the 
389 four-digit SIC code industries, into 10 variation clusters. The within-industry variation in 
this case corresponds to the standard deviation of the several within firm means, for each 
industry. It is important to refer that the standard deviation that represents the leverage 
dispersion inside an industry must be limited between 0 and 0.5. The reason for this limitation 
resides in the fact that we have limited book leverage ratios to rely into the closed unit 
interval, therefore, a minimum of 0 (no dispersion) and a maximum of 0.5 will occur when 
half of the firms in the industry have no leverage and half only have debt in their capital 
structures. According to figure 4, 165 industries rely on the interval between 0.15 and 0.2, 
                                                                              
       _cons     .1329951   .0010685   124.47   0.000     .1309009    .1350894
      median     .5747946   .0037753   152.25   0.000     .5673951    .5821942
                                                                              
bookleverage        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    8179.70692158302  .051671532           Root MSE      =   .2123
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1277
    Residual    7134.91881158301  .045071849           R-squared     =  0.1277
       Model    1044.78812     1  1044.78812           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,158301) =23180.50
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  158303
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being this, the interval with the maximum number of industries. By observing the histogram 
we are able to conclude that it follows a symmetric distribution. 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of the leverage dispersion across industries 
The histogram presents the number of industries that have a within-industry dispersion inside the 
clusters presented in the horizontal axis. The within-industry variation is calculated as the standard 
deviation of the several within firm mean, for each industry and it is constrained between 0 and 0.5. 




The terms “level” and “consistency” must be defined, to facilitate the explanation of the 
following analysis. The term “level” is referred to the amount of leverage dispersion inside 
some industry and the term “consistency” is mentioned to the variability that this “level” 
suffers across time. In other words, an industry with a low level but with a high consistency is 
an industry, in which firms have similar leverage ratios and that this situation is constant over 
time. 
The first step of this analysis is to compute the within-industry variation, which is 
computed as the standard deviation of the firm’s leverage ratios for the different industries per 
year, from 1974 until 2015. Next, for each year all the industries are ranked according to the 
within-industry variation, being attributed the value of 1 to the industry with the lowest 
standard deviation for that year. The third step in this process is to compute the time series 
mean and standard deviation of the ranking3 values for each industry. The time series mean 
provides us information regarding the “level” of within-industry variation, and the standard 
deviation informs us about the “consistency” of the within-industry variation. 
                                                 
3 We decided to use the ranking values, because in this analysis we just care about the relative position and 
not about the absolute values. 
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With the purpose of better understanding how “level” and “consistency” are related, we 
built a scatter plot, presented in figure 5. Each point presented in the image corresponds to a 
different industry, 389 points in total, which matches the number of industries. The horizontal 
axis illustrates the variable “level”, so the points that are located to the right have a higher 
capital structure dispersion. The vertical axis corresponds to the variable “consistency”, so the 
points that are located on the upper side of the graph have a lower “consistency”. It is 
important to reaffirm that “consistency” is calculated as the standard deviation of the ranking 
values for each industry, so the higher the standard deviation the lower the “consistency”. 
 
Figure 5: “Level” and “consistency” of within-industry variation 
The data used for the construction of the scatter plot was the book sample. First, it is calculated for 
each year, the within-industry variation as the standard deviation of the firms’ leverage ratios per 
industry. Then all the industries are ranked according to the within-industry variation, for each year. 
Finally, it is calculated the time series mean (“level”) and standard deviation (“consistency”) of the 
ranking values for each industry. 
 
 
The previous analysis could be affected by the fact that some industries have no data for 
some years, which could have an influence in the ranking levels. In order to overcome this 
problem, we repeated all the previous methodology, but this time, we only included industries 
that had data for all years between 1974 and 2015. By applying this restriction, our sample 
ended up with 236 industries. Below we are able to find figure 6, which was built in the same 
way as figure 5, instead of using the entire sample, it was only considered the 236 industries 
that had data for the whole data period. 
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Figure 6: “Level” and “consistency” of within-industry variation, for industries with non-
missing data from 1974 until 2015 
This scatter plot was built following the exact same methodology as the one used in figure 5. The only 
difference relies on the data used, since in this figure, we only consider industries with a value for 
within-industry variation for all years in the period between 1974 and 2015. 
 
 
From the analysis of figure 5 and 6, we can conclude that both figures share the same the 
inverted U shape. This finding allow us to conclude that the industries with the highest level 
of “consistency” are the ones with the highest and the lowest “level”. In other words, the 
industries that have the highest or the lowest capital structure dispersion tend to remain this 
way for long periods of time. This conclusion is very important and introduces to a new 
stylized fact in this area of research. 
In addition to the figures 5 and 6, we are going to provide tables 4 and 5 with the top and 
bottom 30 four-digit SIC industries in terms of mean (“level”) and standard deviation 
(“consistency”) of the rankings computed above. It is important to explain again that 
industries that are part of the top mean correspond to industries with a high capital structure 
dispersion, and industries at the top standard deviation correspond to industries that see their 
capital structure dispersion change a lot across the different years. Table 4 includes all the 
data in book sample, while table 5 only includes industries that had data for all years between 
1974 and 2015, in the same way as figure 6 was constructed. Both tables, have some 
highlighted cells in the columns that correspond to the top and bottom standard deviation. The 
cells marked by the light grey are the industries that can be found in the mean bottom 30. In 
contrast, the cells marked by the dark grey are the industries that can be found in the mean top 
30. According to table 4, we can observe that 21 out of 30 of the industries presented in the 
bottom standard deviation (high consistency) are presented in the top/bottom mean. This 
finding confirms the idea of an inverted U shape in figure 5. Still in table 4, it is possible to 
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Table 4: Top and bottom 30 industries in terms of “level” and “consistency” 
The data used for the construction of this table was the book sample. From the values obtained of the 
time series mean (“level”) and standard deviation (“consistency”) of the ranking values, we present in 
this table the top and bottom 30 industries. The cells marked by the light grey are the industries that 
can be found in the mean bottom 30. In contrast, the cells marked by the dark grey are the industries 
that can be found in the mean top 30. 
 
 











1 7310 29 5271 2 4950 6 3677 2 
2 4841 121 3677 2 8351 5 5271 2 
3 4833 82 5180 2 7331 7 5180 2 
4 7990 119 2024 2 3931 8 2024 2 
5 5812 213 5064 2 7377 10 7000 2 
6 7500 21 7000 2 3050 9 7990 119 
7 7350 28 5020 3 8090 29 3822 9 
8 4812 129 4961 4 2080 18 5812 213 
9 3089 75 7385 5 8071 43 4841 121 
10 7380 20 3822 9 2741 20 5064 2 
11 7370 345 5810 4 2590 3 2840 15 
12 5000 6 2600 15 8000 8 4833 82 
13 2844 44 2673 7 3790 11 7359 62 
14 7011 99 3433 3 2540 7 4812 129 
15 7359 62 7841 6 3713 10 3390 5 
16 3060 18 3390 5 4822 7 4213 86 
17 4899 88 2771 3 3444 7 7370 345 
18 4213 86 3720 3 7900 15 4400 55 
19 4991 52 3334 10 2253 12 3714 143 
20 7389 76 3272 8 3550 11 3089 75 
21 2510 38 3541 8 4220 9 4512 101 
22 4400 55 7330 3 3590 15 7011 99 
23 5084 16 1044 5 800 9 4011 58 
24 3080 34 7320 5 3960 6 3312 105 
25 2721 27 1090 27 3086 11 5190 28 
26 1311 848 5093 4 8050 16 2761 16 
27 4832 42 5960 9 5400 16 3613 8 
28 3678 17 2732 3 2250 23 3721 19 
29 7830 23 3824 7 3851 19 2600 15 




After a more careful analysis of table 4, we start to observe a very interesting pattern 
across the number of firms within each of the different industries presented. The industries 
that are more consistent in terms of within-industry variation are the ones with a very high or 
very low number of firms. The bottom five standard deviation is composed of industries that 
are only composed of 2 firms. The same can be observed from the bottom mean column, in 
which industries with the lowest capital structure dispersion are mainly composed of less than 
5 firms. 
All these problems lead us to create the already mentioned sub-sample formed of only 236 
industries. Again this sub-sample was created by only including industries that had data for all 
years between 1974 and 2015. With this sub-sample was created table 5, in the exact same 
way as table 4. From table 5, we notice that all the problems of the previous table 
disappeared. We still notice that the most consistent industries are the ones with a large 
number of firms. This finding is perfectly justifiable because in an industry with many firms, 
any change in the capital structure of a firm has a very low impact in the within-industry 
variation for that industry. 
We can also conclude that 18 out of 30 of the industries presented in the bottom standard 
deviation (high consistency) are presented in the top/bottom mean. If we compare both tables, 
it is evident the decrease in the number of light grey highlighted cells, given the elimination 
of industries with a small number of firms. In the bottom standard deviation the light grey 
cells decreased from 10 to 6 and the dark grey cells increased from 11 to 12.  
In table 5, for the first time we have industries with very low consistency presented in the 
top and bottom mean. Nevertheless, it is interesting to notice that those industries are located 




Table 5: Top and bottom 30 industries in terms of “level” and “consistency”, for industries 
with non-missing data from 1974 until 2015 
This table was built following the exact same methodology as the one used in table 4. The only 
difference relies on the data used, since in this figure, we only consider industries with a value for 
within-industry variation for all years in the period between 1974 and 2015. The cells marked by the 
light grey are the industries that can be found in the mean bottom 30. In contrast, the cells marked by 
the dark grey are the industries that can be found in the mean top 30. 
 
 











1 4841 121 2840 15 5945 13 7990 119 
2 4833 82 2761 16 1540 17 5812 213 
3 7990 119 2531 7 4610 35 4841 121 
4 5812 213 2990 13 3100 12 2840 15 
5 7500 21 3600 10 7381 14 4833 82 
6 7350 28 5063 11 3570 10 7359 62 
7 4812 129 5110 22 2511 15 4812 129 
8 3089 75 3011 12 2111 15 7370 345 
9 7380 20 2780 7 1731 14 4213 86 
10 7370 345 5150 10 2340 13 4400 55 
11 5000 6 2085 8 3569 17 3089 75 
12 7011 99 3330 23 3678 17 4512 101 
13 7359 62 3760 7 5130 7 2761 16 
14 2844 44 3317 17 7323 9 3714 143 
15 3060 18 4513 10 2522 12 3312 105 
16 4899 88 2851 18 5600 36 7011 99 
17 4213 86 2273 20 2835 46 4011 58 
18 7389 76 1623 18 3634 19 5190 28 
19 4991 52 7311 25 5412 14 3721 19 
20 2510 38 2611 9 5500 42 3674 241 
21 4400 55 3241 36 5990 43 2890 36 
22 5084 16 3510 21 5940 43 3585 42 
23 3080 34 2070 12 3669 24 3760 7 
24 2721 27 3721 19 5712 22 5311 69 
25 1311 848 5013 15 3443 24 2300 74 
26 7812 52 2631 21 3357 23 3600 10 
27 7830 23 3561 17 4100 17 100 40 
28 2860 67 5130 7 2820 22 1311 848 
29 3678 17 3825 44 4210 49 2531 7 




4.5. Characteristics of industries with high and low capital structure 
variation 
Now that we already know which industries have the highest and lowest capital structure 
dispersion, the objective of the following analysis is to understand which industry 
characteristics differ the most between these two groups of industries. In this section we are 
going to focus only on the bottom and top mean industries presented in table 5. Taking into 
consideration the purpose of this section, the industries to be studied are the ones at the top 
and bottom level, since we are only interested in the industries with the highest and lowest 
within-industry variation, and not about how consistent is this capital structure dispersion. In 
appendix 6, it is provided the names of the industries that are going to be further studied in 
this section. 
 
The variables chosen to characterize the industries at the top and bottom within-industry 
variation were the ones that according to Almazan and Molina (2002), MacKay and Phillips 
(2005), Lemmon et al. (2008) and Graham and Leary (2011) were the most relevant in 
explaining both leverage and capital structure variation. All variables definitions are located 
in the appendix 2. 
The first variable is the time series average of the different within-industry variations. The 
variable is named as Average yearly SD(Lev). This variable provides an idea of the 
dimension of the capital structure dispersion in the top and bottom industries. From table 6, 
we confirm that industries at the top have a higher capital structure variation. The average 
within-industry variation for the top industries is 0.23, against the 0.11 from the bottom 
industries. 
The second variable to be studied is the number of firms per industry. From table 5, we 
can understand that industries with the highest capital structure dispersion are the ones with a 
larger number of firms. If we reflect on this observation, actually it makes sense that 
industries with a large number of firms tend to have a higher diversity on the way that those 
firms choose its leverage ratios. According to table 6, we understand that top industries have a 
significant higher standard deviation in terms of the number of firms (154.66 vs 8.73), 
something that we can also observe by the difference between the maximum and minimum 
values. One interesting observation is the fact that the top median (53.50)4 is higher than the 
maximum number of firms (44) in the bottom industries. From table 7, we observe a positive 
                                                 
4 In excel if there is an even number of numbers in the set, then median calculates the average of the two 
numbers in the middle. 
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correlation (0.30), which confirms our initial idea that capital structure dispersion increases 
with the number of firms. 
The third variable was inspired in the study MacKay and Phillips (2005), which defends 
that firms near the industry median capital–labor ratio use less financial leverage than firms 
that deviate from the industry median capital–labor ratio. Based on this observation we can 
conclude that the higher the capital-labor dispersion the higher the capital structure 
dispersion. In our study we decided to use the coefficient of variation, as proxy for the 
technology (capital-labor) dispersion inside each industry. By comparing the means for the 
top and bottom industries, it is clear that there is a higher technology variation in the 
industries with the highest capital structure dispersion. It is also possible to observe that the 
median in the most dispersed industries is higher than the maximum of the bottom industries. 
From table 7, we observe a positive correlation (0.41), which confirms our initial idea that 
capital structure dispersion increases with the technology dispersion. These results are 
consistent with the results from MacKay and Phillips (2005).  
The fourth variable is the proportion of capitalized lease obligations of the total book 
assets. According to Almazan and Molina (2002), intra-industry capital structure dispersion is 
greater in industries in which firms use leasing more intensively. From the results obtained in 
table 6, the difference between the top (1.5%) and bottom mean (1.1%) is not very significant. 
This variable is very problematic given the possibility that firms have to opt between 
operating and capital leases. In the end the impact of this choice on the firm’s capital structure 
is very high. Taking this into consideration, it could happen that industries that use more 
leasing have a higher capital structure dispersion, motivated in a large part to accounting 
choices. From table 7, we observe a small positive correlation (0.18), which confirms our 
initial idea that capital structure dispersion increases little in industries that use leasing more 
intensively. 
The fifth variable was inspired in the study of Titman and Wessels (1988), which suggests 
the ratio between selling expenses over sales, as a proxy to the product uniqueness. According 
to Almazan and Molina (2002) the higher the product uniqueness inside an industry, the more 
specific is the firm in terms of leverage ratio and other firm’s financials, leading to a higher 
intra-industry leverage variation. From the analysis of table 6, we confirm that top industries 
have a higher product uniqueness on average when compared to the bottom industries. Also 
note that the value for the median is a higher for industries at the top within industry variation. 
An alternative proxy to measure product uniqueness is the ratio between research and 
development over the value of sales. In consonance to the previous proxy, we notice that 
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industries at the top within-industry variation are more R&D intensive. From table 7, we 
observe that both proxies for product uniqueness present a small positive correlation (0.17), 
which confirms our initial idea that capital structure dispersion increases little with the level 
of product uniqueness. 
The next variable to be analyzed is firm age, which we proxy by counting the number of 
firm-year observations for each company. It is possible to conclude that industries with low 
capital structure dispersion tend to have a higher longevity. From table 7, we observe one of 
the most significant correlations (-0.57), which confirms that capital structure dispersion 
decreases with the firm’s longevity. 
The eighth variable to be analyzed is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). This 
variable measures the market concentration, through the market share of the several firms 
within each industry. The higher the HHI the more concentrated is the industry, that is, the 
level of competition is smaller. In the other hand, the smaller the HHI the more competitive is 
the industry, in other words, the level of competition is higher. According to table 6, it is 
evident that industries with a higher capital structure dispersion tend to be more competitive. 
The average HHI for the top industries is 2822, in contrast to the bottom industries that is 
4314. The relation between the level of competition and the intra-industry leverage dispersion 
was not consensual in the literature. According to MacKay and Phillips (2005), the leverage 
in competitive industries is reduced and more dispersed. In contrast, Almazan and Molina 
(2002) defends that intra-industry capital structure dispersion is greater in industries that are 
highly concentrated. From table 7, we observe a negative correlation (-0.41), which confirms 
that capital structure dispersion increases with the level of competition. Our results 
corroborate with the results provided by MacKay and Phillips (2005). 
The variable asset tangibility was inspired by Lemmon et al. (2008), who report that asset 
tangibility captures most of the variance decomposition. Asset tangibility is the ratio of net 
property, plant and equipment over total assets. From the analysis of table 6, we conclude that 
top industries have slightly more tangible assets than the bottom industries. By analyzing 
table 7, we observe a positive correlation (0.22), which confirms our initial idea that capital 
structure dispersion increases with the assets tangibility. 
The tenth variable to be analyzed is the Z-score, which is used to predict the probability 
that a firm will go into bankruptcy. The higher the value for the Z-score the better is the 
financial health of the firm. It is evident that industries at the top intra-industry dispersion, 
have a worse financial situation than firms in the bottom dispersion. From table 7, we observe 
a significant negative correlation (-0.50), which confirms that capital structure dispersion is 
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associated to higher probability of default. These results could be associated to the previous 
observation that firms in the top dispersion tend to have a shorter longevity. 
The next variable represents the firm size, which is equal to the total book assets. Table 6, 
show us that on average industries with low capital structure variation are larger than the 
industries with a high variation. From table 7, we observe a small negative correlation (-0.15), 
which endorses the previous conclusion that capital structure dispersion decreases with the 
size of firms. 
In terms of profitability and risk, the differences between the two groups of industries are 
not very significant, but we can say that the industries at the top within-industry variation are 
slightly more profitable and more risky. The results presented at table 7, confirm a small 
positive relation between the intra-industry dispersion and the level of risk and profitability. 
The fourteenth variable to be analyzed was developed by us, with the purpose of 
understanding if capital structure dispersion is related to the fact that companies pay 
dividends. For all firm-year observations, if a company paid dividends, then it will receive the 
value of 1, in any other circumstance it would receive the value of 0. The next step is to 
compute for each firm the time series mean, and finally the cross section average across firms 
within the same industry. For our analysis, the higher the value of our variable “dividend 
payer” the higher the number of firms in that industry paying dividends. Table 6 shows that 
industries at the bottom intra-industry variation tend to have more firms paying dividends. In 
the same line of reasoning, table 7 present a significant negative correlation (-0.44), which 
confirms that capital structure dispersion is associated with a smaller number of firms paying 
dividends. 
Finally, we observe that the top industries are more leveraged than the bottom ones, as 
illustrated by the difference in the average leverage ratio of high dispersed industries (39%) to 
low dispersed industries (26%). From table 7, we observe the most significant correlation 





Table 6: Characteristics of top and bottom intra-industry dispersion industries 
The most significant variables in the literature explaining both leverage ratios and capital structure dispersion were selected, in order to trace a profile of the 
type of industries with the highest and lowest capital structure dispersion. The industries selected were the ones at the top and bottom level in table 5. The 
construction of the following variables is provided in appendix 2. 
 
Top within industry variation Bottom within industry variation 
 
Mean Median Std..Dev. Min. Max. Mean Median Std..Dev. Min. Max. 
Average yearly SD(Lev) 0.23 0.23 0.02 0.21 0.28 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.13 
Nr. companies per industry 96.87 53.50 154.66 6.00 848.00 16.73 15.50 8.73 7.00 44.00 
CV(capital / labor) 2.09 1.59 1.88 0.56 10.18 0.75 0.76 0.24 0.31 1.49 
Lease / assets 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 
Sell exp / sales 0.77 0.22 1.60 0.02 8.55 0.31 0.18 0.63 0.06 3.63 
Firm age 11.97 11.70 2.58 7.40 17.67 16.64 16.13 4.07 9.62 25.80 
HHI 2822.41 2119.63 1723.67 883.27 8863.52 4314.48 4085.11 1670.49 2242.35 7883.91 
R&D / Sales 0.11 0.00 0.31 0.00 1.27 0.05 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.76 
Tangibility 0.39 0.38 0.18 0.12 0.77 0.30 0.28 0.15 0.10 0.63 
Z-score 0.98 0.83 0.92 -0.67 3.08 1.98 2.09 0.84 -0.74 3.59 
Firm size 1843.13 1076.27 2594.10 132.57 11158.06 2893.40 1758.63 3891.06 58.63 20255.35 
Profitability 0.12 0.13 0.05 -0.02 0.24 0.12 0.12 0.04 -0.02 0.20 
Risk 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.10 
Dividend payer 0.45 0.44 0.12 0.17 0.70 0.59 0.56 0.18 0.22 0.90 
Book leverage 0.39 0.38 0.09 0.16 0.57 0.26 0.26 0.06 0.15 0.39 
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Table 7: Correlations 
This tables provides the correlation between the explanatory variables and the time series average of 
the different within-industry variation. 
 
Average yearly SD(Lev) 
Nr. companies per industry 0.30 
CV(capital/labor) 0.41 
Lease / assets 0.18 
Sell exp / sales 0.17 
Firm age (0.57) 
HHI (0.41) 
R&D / Sales 0.17 
Tangibility 0.22 
Z-score (0.50) 
Firm size (0.15) 
Profitability 0.04 
Risk 0.10 
Dividend payer (0.44) 
Book leverage 0.67 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this study we have focused on American companies from 1974 until 2015, excluding 
firms from the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate sector, as well as those operating in the 
Utilities and Public Administration divisions. Based on this sample, it was our objective to 
better understand how leverage variation can be decomposed and its development through 
time. 
Having this in mind, we observe that most of the variation in financial structures arises 
within-industries rather than between industries, a result consistent with the findings of 
Mackay and Phillips (2005). Furthermore, this study remains aligned with the results that 
arose from Lemmon et al. (2008) study, as we concluded that leverage shows greater levels of 
variation cross-sectionally rather than within firms. 
Regarding leverage’s evolution through time, we observed that within-industry variation 
has been regularly higher than between industry variation. Additionally, in the period between 
1974 and 2015, within-industry variation was the one that showcased the greatest increase 
(43%). Regarding the impact of the 2008 financial crisis, we observed that there was an 
increase in the leverage variation, even though we are not able to identify a relevant impact of 
the 2008 financial crisis in the leverage variation variables. 
After understanding that most of the leverage variation comes from firms in the same 
industry, we wanted to better understand the importance of industry to firm financial leverage. 
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Aligned with the findings of Mackay and Philips (2005) and Lemmon et al. (2008), our work 
emphasizes that industry medians explain a small part of the leverage variation, as when 
regressing these factors on firm leverage ratios we are only able obtain an adjusted R-square 
of 12.77%. 
Based upon the previous conclusion, which pointed towards industry’s limited relevance 
in explaining firms’ financial leverage, we decided to expand our analysis, so that we could 
better understand the characteristics of intra-industry capital structures’ dispersion. We came 
up with a new stylized fact in this area of research, by concluding that industries which 
portray the highest or the lowest capital structures’ dispersion tend to remain this way for long 
periods of time. 
Finally, we took, from pre-existing literature, the most relevant variables in explaining 
both leverage and capital structure variation, in order to trace a profile of the industries with 
the highest and lowest within-industry leverage variation. In doing so, we concluded that the 
most relevant variables show us that capital structure variation is associated to industries in 
which firms have shorter longevities, higher probabilities of default, as well as, to more 
indebted firms. 
6. Limitations and future research 
Several authors have been questioning the way that leverage ratios have been built and the 
impact that this variable mis-measurement is having in empirical capital structure theory. 
Some academic papers like Welch (2011), suggests that a firm with more non-financial 
liabilities appears less levered. According to Cornaggia et al. (2009) there is an increasing use 
of leasing as a financing instrument, substituting the debt usage. This finding incentivizes 
other studies like Rampini and Viswanathan (2010) and Rauh and Sufi (2012) to defend that 
the capitalized value of operating leases should be considered as debt.  
In a study that tries to understand the impact of the firm’s industry into its own leverage 
ratio, it is important to be successful at identifying the right criteria to separate firms into the 
different economic markets. Several authors question the use of the SIC system. According to 
Clarke (1989) the SIC system does not identify firms with similar sales, profit rates or stock 
price changes. Additionally, Kahle and Walking (1996) reported that there are significant 
differences in the SIC codes designated by Compustat and CRSP databases, affirming that 
nearly 80 percent of the classifications disagree at the four-digit level. An alternative to the 
SIC system could be the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), which was 
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adopted in 1997 to replace SIC system. Allocating firms into industries rises another issue. 
How do you classify firms that operate in multiple industries, i.e., conglomerates? 
For future research it will be interesting to study the changes that the new IFRS 16 will 
have in the firm’s capital structure, as well as, the impact on the different types of leverage 
variation. This new standard will be applied to annual reporting periods beginning on or after 
January 2019, and will provide a single lessee accounting model. By eliminating the 
manager’s freedom regarding the type of leasing that they wanted for their books, we are 
expecting a more accurate definition of the firm’s capital structures from 2019 onwards. 
Another interesting area of research would be a deeper analysis of the impact of the 2008 
financial crisis, on the different types of leverage variation.  
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Appendix 1: Compustat Missing Value Codes 
This appendix provides the explanation for the codes that appear in our database. All 
observations with the following codes were eliminated from our sample. 
 
Appendix 2: Variables definitions 
This appendix provides all the details regarding the source and definition of the variables used 
in this study. In parentheses you are able to find both the annual Compustat item number and 
item name. 
 





𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 (199)(𝑃𝑅𝐶𝐶. 𝐶) ∗ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (54)(𝐶𝑆𝐻𝑃𝑅𝐼) 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡





) = 𝐶𝑉 (
𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦, 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 (8)(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑇)

















𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒(46)(𝑋𝑅𝐷)
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
 





𝑗 stands for industry and 𝑖 stands for firm. The meaning of 𝑠𝑖 is the market share for firm 𝑖 in 
the market 𝑗. Market share was computed based on sales values. 
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =











𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (13)(𝑂𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑃)
𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑆𝐷(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) 
 
Appendix 3: Firms per industry 
Below we provide for both samples (Book and Market sample) a graph that tries to illustrate 




Appendix 4: Dispersion in book financial leverage for market sample 
In our study we have two data samples one used to compute book leverage ratios and another 
one used to compute market leverage ratios. In the figure below is presented the dispersion in 




Appendix 5: Post crisis evolution of leverage ratios 
This bar graph displays the cross-sectional average in book leverage ratios for the period 




Appendix 6: Industries at the top and bottom within-industry variation 






Top Industry Name 
1 4841 CABLE & OTHER PAY TELEVISION SERVICES 
2 4833 TELEVISION BROADCASTING STATIONS 
3 7990 SERVICES-MISCELLANEOUS AMUSEMENT & RECREATION 
4 5812 RETAIL-EATING PLACES 
5 7500 SERVICES-AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR, SERVICES & PARKING 
6 7350 SERVICES-MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT RENTAL & LEASING 
7 4812 RADIOTELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS 
8 3089 PLASTICS PRODUCTS, NEC 
9 7380 SERVICES-MISCELLANEOUS BUSINESS SERVICES 
10 7370 SERVICES-COMPUTER PROGRAMMING, DATA PROCESSING, ETC. 
11 5000 WHOLESALE-DURABLE GOODS 
12 7011 HOTELS & MOTELS 
13 7359 SERVICES-EQUIPMENT RENTAL & LEASING, NEC 
14 2844 PERFUMES, COSMETICS & OTHER TOILET PREPARATIONS 
15 3060 FABRICATED RUBBER PRODUCTS, NEC 
16 4899 COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, NEC 
17 4213 TRUCKING (NO LOCAL) 
18 7389 SERVICES-BUSINESS SERVICES, NEC 
19 4991 COGENERATION SERVICES & SMALL POWER PRODUCERS 
20 2510 HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE 
21 4400 WATER TRANSPORTATION 
22 5084 WHOLESALE-INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT 
23 3080 MISCELLANEOUS PLASTICS PRODUCTS 
24 2721 PERIODICALS: PUBLISHING OR PUBLISHING & PRINTING 
25 1311 CRUDE PETROLEUM & NATURAL GAS 
26 7812 SERVICES-MOTION PICTURE & VIDEO TAPE PRODUCTION 
27 7830 SERVICES-MOTION PICTURE THEATERS 
28 2860 INDUSTRIAL ORGANIC CHEMICALS 
29 3678 ELECTRONIC CONNECTORS 








Bottom Industry Name 
1 2840 SOAP, DETERGENTS, CLEANG PREPARATIONS, PERFUMES, COSMETICS 
2 2761 MANIFOLD BUSINESS FORMS 
3 2531 PUBLIC BLDG & RELATED FURNITURE 
4 2990 MISCELLANEOUS PRODUCTS OF PETROLEUM & COAL 
5 3600 ELECTRONIC & OTHER ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT (NO COMPUTER EQUIP) 
6 5063 WHOLESALE-ELECTRICAL APPARATUS & EQUIPMENT, WIRING SUPPLIES 
7 5110 WHOLESALE-PAPER & PAPER PRODUCTS 
8 3011 TIRES & INNER TUBES 
9 2780 BLANKBOOKS, LOOSELEAF BINDERS & BOOKBINDG & RELATD WORK 
10 5150 WHOLESALE-FARM PRODUCT RAW MATERIALS 
11 2085 DISTILLED AND BLENDED LIQUORS 
12 3330 PRIMARY SMELTING & REFINING OF NONFERROUS METALS 
13 3760 GUIDED MISSILES & SPACE VEHICLES & PARTS 
14 3317 STEEL PIPE & TUBES 
15 4513 AIR COURIER SERVICES 
16 2851 PAINTS, VARNISHES, LACQUERS, ENAMELS & ALLIED PRODS 
17 2273 CARPETS & RUGS 
18 1623 WATER, SEWER, PIPELINE, COMM & POWER LINE CONSTRUCTION 
19 7311 SERVICES-ADVERTISING AGENCIES 
20 2611 PULP MILLS 
21 3241 CEMENT, HYDRAULIC 
22 3510 ENGINES & TURBINES 
23 2070 FATS & OILS 
24 3721 AIRCRAFT 
25 5013 WHOLESALE-MOTOR VEHICLE SUPPLIES & NEW PARTS 
26 2631 PAPERBOARD MILLS 
27 3561 PUMPS & PUMPING EQUIPMENT 
28 5130 WHOLESALE-APPAREL, PIECE GOODS & NOTIONS 
29 3825 INSTRUMENTS FOR MEAS & TESTING OF ELECTRICITY & ELEC SIGNALS 
30 2000 FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS 
 
